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SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING AND CHANDLER v. MILLER:
IS THE SUPREME COURT MAKING THE RIGHT DECISIONS?
During the last decade, the United States Supreme Court has renderedfour
major decisions regardingthe validity of suspicionlessdrug testingpolicies. Such
drug testingpolicies have become a common wayfor employers and other interested
parties-includingthe government-both to deter the use ofdrugs and to determine
who is acting under the influence of illegalnarcotics. Because government officials
often randomly select individualsfor drug testing, some of these individuals have
chargedthat a governmentaldrug testingpolicy violates the FourthAmendment.
The Supreme Court found this argument unconvincing in three cases decided
between 1989 and 1997, but in its most recent decision the Courtfound the argument
persuasive and struck down the drug testing policy in question. This Note will
explain how the Supreme Court's most recent drug testing decisionfails to follow
established-andunrenounced--Supreme Courtprecedent.

"'The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.""
INTRODUCTION

Illegal drug use is a pervasive and deadly problem in the United States.
Although a 1994 study by the National Institute of Drug Abuse indicated that drug
use was declining, a 1995 survey conducted by the same organization found that "an
estimated 12.8 million Americans had used an illegal drug in the past month." 2
During the 1980s, private companies began implementing drug testing policies in an
attempt to curb drug use in the workplace;3 and in 1986, President Ronald Reagan
issued an Executive Order4 requiring drug tests for approximately 400,000 federal
employees.5 Because a relatively large number of people use illegal narcotics, 6 many

Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997) (quoting Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). This warning should apply not only to
local, state, and federal executive and legislative branches, but to the judiciary as well.
2 D. Garrison "Gary" Hill, The Needle and the Damage Done: The Fourth Amendment,
Substance Abuse and Drug Testing in the Public Sector, 8 S.C. LAW. 19, 19 (1997).
3 See id. Private employers are not subject to all of the constitutional restraints with
which the federal government must comply. Although constitutional questions arise from
private sector drug testing policies, such questions are not based on Fourth Amendment
violations, and this Note will not address them.
4 Exec. Order.No. 12564, 3 C. F. R. 224 (1986).
See Hill, supra note 2, at 19.
6 See id. ("[T]he National Institute of Drug Abuse ("NIDA") found that while drug use
was declining, 1.3 million Americans had used cocaine in the last month, 1.2 million had
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governmental, non-governmental, and quasi-governmental entities have endeavored
to implement a drug testing policy to ensure that individuals using such narcotics are
not in a position to endanger others or to encourage them to use drugs.7 Although in
many instances the Court has declined to review such policies,' this Note will
analyze the circumstances in which the Court reviewed the constitutionality of
suspicionless drug testing policies. Part I of this Note provides a brief analysis of the
Fourth Amendment.9 This section first will identify what constitutes a search or
seizure and the reasons drug testing may qualify as such." It will identify the reasons
why the Court normally requires that both a warrant and probable cause support a

used crack within the last year and 8.5 percent of the population had used marijuana in the
past year.").
' 'See, e.g., Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (holding that school

athletes can be required, under the Constitution, to submit to drug tests); National Treas.
Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (holding the drug testing policy of the United
States Customs Service constitutional); Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602

(1989) (stating that the Federal Railroad Administration constitutionally could mandate its
employees to submit to drug testing); Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1020 (1991) (stating that the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice can require a prescreening drug test for new employees); Hartness v.
Bush, 919 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1251 (1991) (upholding the
random drug testing of federal employees who possess secret clearances); National Treas.
Emp. Union v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (allowing drug testing of Department
of Agriculture employees who hold safety or security sensitive jobs); National Fed'n of Fed.
Emp. v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990) (finding
that the Navy randomly can drug test civilian employees if the employees occupy certain
positions); Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989) (permitting the requirement of a compulsory urinalysis of a
police officer); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
requirement of a mandatory urinalysis of a firefighter was a constitutional search); McDonell
v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that urinalysis requirements were based on
random suspicion constitutionally permissible for Department of Corrections personnel);
Alverado v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 759 P.2d 427 (Wash. 1988), cert. denied,

490 U.S. 1004 (1989) (explaining that mandatory urinalysis of prospective employees was
a valid, warrantless administrative search when required at a nuclear power plant).
8 See supra note 7.

9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons...
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
'0See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (holding that there is no
expectation of privacy in information revealed by a chemical test if such information reveals
only the existence of contraband). But cf.Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U. S.
602, 617 (stating that because the chemical testing of urine can reveal private information,
such as epilepsy or pregnancy, it must be considered a search). Because the Court has
deemed that a drug test is a search, there is no need to analyze here the reasons why a drug
test could be considered a seizure as well. See infra note 22.
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search or seizure.1" Finally, Part I explains the special needs balancing test used by
courts to decide suspicionless drug testing cases.
The Supreme Court has decided four important suspicionless drug testing cases:
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,12 Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass 'n, 3 Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton "'and, most recently,
Chandlerv. Miller.'5 These cases form the framework for an analysis of the Supreme
Court's treatment of suspicionless drug testing policies. Part II of this Note describes
the facts and conclusions of each case.
Part III of this Note examines why the Court in Chandlerdecided that the drug
testing policy in question mandated a different result than those of the three previous
Supreme Court drug testing cases.' 6 This section considers policy implications and
legal theories, and examines the decisions of Justice Scalia to exemplify some of the
Court's inconsistencies in its suspicionless drug testing doctrine. Part IV identifies
the scope of the Chandler decision and explains how the Supreme Court, and some
later commentators on Chandler,came to the wrong conclusion. 7 This section also
suggests guidelines for applying the Court's precedent to future cases involving
suspicionless drug testing policies.

I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. What Constitutes a Search or Seizure?
The phrase "search and seizure" likely is one of the most recognizable clauses
in the United States Constitution. It often is difficult to understand exactly what
"search and seizure" means, however, because the phrase is stated in such a broad
fashion in the text of the Fourth Amendment.'" Rather than a blackletter rule of law,

Although this Note will identify some exceptions to the requirements of warrant and
probable cause, a review of all such exceptions to this Fourth Amendment requirement is
outside the scope of this Note. For a thorough discussion of these exceptions, see generally
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND

COMMENTARY

136-362 (5th ed. 1996).

489 U.S. 656 (1989).
13 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
14 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
'
17 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
16 The Court upheld the drug testing policies at issue in Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65,
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677-79, and Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633-34, but invalidated the drug
testing policy in Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1304-05.
'7 But cf. George M. Dery 111, Are Politicians More Deserving of Privacy Than
Schoolchildren? How Chandler v. Miller Exposed the Absurdities of Fourth Amendment
"Special Needs" Balancing, 40 ARiz. L. REv. 73 (1998) (declaring that the Chandler
decision could not be distinguished rationally from the Court's decisions in Skinner, Von
Raab, and Vernonia).
18 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, supra note 9.
12
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It is more an expression of a philosophy that grew out of offensive British
procedures prior to the Revolution and was written into the fundamental
law of the land by framers who hoped to assure that government must
always respect the sanctity of the people and the effects they hold dear. 9
This definition presents a valid theoretical purpose, but the practical difficulty with
the definition is that it makes possible a number of different interpretations of Fourth
Amendment applications.
The Fourth Amendment only applies when there is governmental action; private
entities are not subject to the Amendment." When governmental action results in a
search 2' or a seizure,22 the Fourth Amendment is applicable. Perhaps the most
controversial part of the Fourth Amendment is its prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures,23 because it is unclear whether reasonableness or the

'9
20

SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 11, at 34.
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) ("[T]he Court has long spoken

of the Fourth Amendment's strictures as restraints imposed upon 'governmental action'-that
is, 'upon the activities of sovereign authority."' (quoting Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
465, 475 (1921))).
2 A search is said to occur when "the police [] have physically intruded into 'a
constitutionally protected area."' I WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1(a), at 380 (3d ed. 1996) (quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). A police officer need not make the intrusion, however, in
order for it to be a search. The Court has held that civil authorities also may make such
intrusions. See, e.g., Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (school
administrators); Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (railroad
authorities); National Treas. Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (Customs
Service officials); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (school administrators);
Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (municipal building inspectors); Frank v,
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (health commissioners). Such civil authorities must comply
with the Fourth Amendment.
22 There are two types of seizures under the Fourth Amendment: seizure of an individual
and seizure of property. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U. S. 621, 625-26 (1991).
[A] seizure [of an individual] occurs "when the officer, by means of physical
force or show ofauthority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen."
... The narrow question before [the Court] is whether, with respect to a show of
authority as with respect to application of physical force, a seizure occurs even
though the subject does not yield. We hold that it does not.
Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (emphasis added)). See also Soldal
v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 61 (1992) ("A 'seizure' of property, we have explained,
occurs when 'there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests
in that property."' (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109, 113 (1984))). But cf.
Skinner, 489 U. S. at 617 n.4 ("It is not necessary... to characterize the taking of blood or
urine samples as a seizure of those bodily fluids, for the privacy expectations protected by
this characterization are adequately taken into account by our conclusion that such intrusions
are searches.").
23 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, supra note 9.
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requirement of a warrant supported by probable cause should be the controlling
factor in determining whether a search or a seizure is constitutionally valid.24 In any
Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court also must address the issue of privacy. With
regard to a search, the privacy issue is "a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' 2 5
Suspicionless drug testing issues exemplify the tension between the warrant clause,
the reasonableness clause, and the right to privacy.
B. The Warrantand Probable Cause Requirement
"Generally, a search, in order to be reasonable, must be carried out pursuant to
a warrant based on probable cause."26 The number of exceptions thAt have developed
to this seemingly simple rule have rendered it anything but simple, yet the rule
remains the initial premise upon which courts base their Fourth Amendment
analysis.27 The Court has indicated consistently that it is constitutionally preferable
to conduct a search with a valid warrant than without.2" One of the reasons for the
warrant preference is to ensure a search is based on the opinion of a neutral and

24 See id Some scholars of the Fourth Amendment believe that because the
"unreasonableness" clause precedes the Warrant Clause, it should predominate and,
therefore, a warrant should be required only in certain instances. See SALTZBURG & CAPRA,
supra note 11, at 33. The Court, however, often has stated that there exists a presumption that
a search or seizure is unreasonable unless the actor obtains a warrant. See, e.g., Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (holding that a warrant is required to enter a home for the
purpose of making an arrest); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (holding that there
is no "murder scene exception" to the warrant requirement). The Court has oscillated
between applying the reasonableness clause and the warrant clause, and has created a middle
ground of exceptions to the warrant clause. One such exception is the special needs exception, which requires a balancing test rather than a strict reasonableness or warrant test. See
Gottlieb, infra note 33, at 28. The Court has leeway in determining how it will apply the
Fourth Amendment in a given case. For a detailed discussion of the special needs application,
see infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
25 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
26

David A. Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of Subject

Employees: Toward a General Rule of Legality Under the FourthAmendment, 48 U. PITT.
L. REV. 201, 214 (1986).
27 Indeed, the warrant requirement has become "so riddled with exceptions that it [is]
basically unrecognizable." California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
28 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (stating that police had no
justification for a warrantless search); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (holding
that police officer did not have sufficient information to support a warrant); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (finding that police had enough time and enough evidence
to obtain a warrant and thus should have done so).
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detached magistrate, rather than that of a police officer or another government official
involved in the search. 9
The primary reason for the warrant requirement, however, is that it establishes
that there must be probable cause for the search in question. One of the most
treasured rights an individual has is "the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."30 At the very
least, a valid warrant declares there is an acceptable reason for intrusion into one's
privacy, because a disinterested party made a determination that there was probable
cause for the intrusion. The purpose of requiring a search warrant is "to guarantee
a substantial probability that the invasions involved in the search will be justified by
discovery of offending items."'" This is the reason the Court has discussed so
thoroughly the requirements of a warrant and probable cause in drug-testing
cases-ignoring' them is no minor endeavor. These requirements are excused only
for important and recognized exceptions; the Court's special needs doctrine is one
such exception. As Part II of this Note will make clear, the Court in Skinner, Von
Raab, Vernonia, and Chandlerspent a great deal of time discussing why (or why not)
the special needs exception applied to cases involving suspicionless drug testing
policies.32
C. The Special Needs Exception

In certain circumstances the warrant and probable cause requirements are
inapplicable to the particular civil search in question. "[I]n determining whether a
search is reasonable, the Court has employed a 'balancing' test, weighing the
intrusion of the government practice against the government interest served by the
program." 33 The Court has been rather liberal in identifying civil searches that,
although not supported by warrant or probable cause, were nevertheless
constitutional because of the existence of special needs.34 The Court fashioned the
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (agreeing that magistrate relied on the
totality of the circumstances in issuing a warrant); Spinelli, 393 U.S. 410 (finding that magistrate took a common sense approach in evaluating an application for a warrant to determine
reasonableness of proposed search). But cf Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971) (holding that an executive officer was not a neutral and detached magistrate); United
States v. Decker, 956 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1992) (explaining that magistrate was not neutral
and detached when he issued a warrant without reading the application for said warrant).
30 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See
29

also 2 LAFAVE, supra note 21, at 2.
" Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth
Amendment, 28 U. CHi. L. REV. 664, 687 (1961).
32 See infra notes 42-103 and accompanying text.
3' David J.Gottlieb, Drug Testing, Collective Suspicion, and a Fourth Amendment Out
of Balance: A Reply to Professor Howard, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 27, 28 (1997).
" See Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1989) (blood test
and urinalysis of railroad employees) (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)
(search of probationer's home)); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (search of
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special needs balancing test because "the traditional requirement of a warrant based
on probable cause is not well-suited to searches for purposes as varied as enforcing
school discipline, public safety, and administrative efficiency."3 The special need
searches, however, cannot be for criminal law enforcement purposes; if officials seek
to use this evidence in criminal proceedings, they generally need a warrant or
probable cause.36 Thus, if the government has a compelling interest that outweighs
the individual's privacy expectations, and the government's interest is for purposes
other than that of criminal law enforcement, then courts may rely upon the special
needs exception to affirm the constitutional validity of a search.
Several drug testing cases highlight the circumstances that satisfy the special
needs exception.37 The Court has stated further that .'individualized suspicion'...
was not a requirement for reasonableness in special needs cases."38 The Court's
premises of certain highly regulated businesses); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)
(work-related searches of employees' desks and offices); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985) (search of student's property by school officials); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979) (body cavity searches of prison inmates); see also Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995) (urinalysis of public school athletes); National Treas. Emp. Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (urinalysis of Customs Service employees); Stigile v.
Clinton, 110 F.3d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1163 (1998) (urinalysis of
federal employees); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 986 (1986) (breath and urine testing of jockeys).
31 SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 11, at 299.
36

See id

See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 ("We have found such 'special needs' to exist in the
public-school context."); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666 ("These substantial interests [to deter
drug use and prevent the promotion of drug users], no less than the Government's concern
for safe rail transportation at issue in Railway Labor Executives, present a special need that
mayjustify departure from the ordinary warrant and probable-cause requirements."); Skinner,
489 U.S. at 619 ("When faced with such special needs, we have not hesitated to balance the
governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and probablecause requirements in the particular context."); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
1245 v. United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 966 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1083 (1991) ("'[T]he usual Fourth Amendment requirements of a warrant
and probable cause do not necessarily apply in the drug testing context."' (quoting Bluestein
v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451, 455 (9th Cir. 1990))); Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170, 172 (D.C.
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1251 (1991) ("[Drug testing] does not require a warrant,
a probable cause, or any level of individualized suspicion ... but is instead governed by the
balancing process weighing the interests of the government qua employer against the privacy
interests of the employees."). But cf. Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997) ("The
need revealed, in short, is symbolic, not 'special,' as that term draws meaning from our case
law.").
38 Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., Vemonia School District 47J v. Acton: The Right Responsefor
Drug Testing of Student Athletes, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 19 (1997) (citing Vemonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. at 653 (1995) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 342 n.8 (1985)). See also Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 ("'[T]he Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion."' (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 342 n.8 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)))); Von
37
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suspicionless drug testing cases are similar in nature to administrative search cases,
"and thus it is not surprising that the infrequent litigation on this subject has drawn
upon the Supreme Court's business inspection cases."39 The Court's decision in New
York v. Burger40 is useful both for identifying the rationale for warrantless
administrative searches and for revealing the similarities to warrantless drug testing.
The Court has made a concerted effort, albeit one marked by inconsistencies, to
delineate what is necessary for a drug testing program to be constitutional; in its case
law, the Court's decisions have turned on the applicability of the special needs
exception to the Fourth Amendment. Although the merits of the special needs
exception are questionable," the Court nevertheless is obligated to apply the special
needs test consistently. The Court failed to do so in Chandler.
II. CREATING AN INCOHERENT FRAMEWORK--DETERMINING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING POLICIES

A. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n4 2
Skinner and its companion case, National TreasuryEmployees Union v. Von
Raab,43 involved the constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing by public
agencies. In Skinner, a number of railroad labor groups protested the Federal
Railroad Administration's ("FRA") requirement that employees be subjected to
blood or urine tests after being involved in major train accidents or after having
Raab, 489 U.S. at 679 ("We hold that the suspicionless testing of employees.., is reasonable."); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 ("In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests
implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered
by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion,
a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.").
" 4 LAFAVE, supra note 21, at 446.
40 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987). The Court stated:
This warrantless inspection, however, even in the context of a pervasively
regulated business, will be deemed to be reasonable only so long as three criteria
are met. First, there must be a "substantial" government interest ....Second,
the warrantless inspection must be "necessary to further [the] regulatory
scheme."... Finally, "the statute's inspection program, in terms of the certainty
and regularity of its application, [must] provid[e] a constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant."
Id.
(citations omitted). The important government interest versus privacy interests distinction
echoes the drug testing constitutionality requirements.
4"This Note is not intended to address the problems inherent in the special needs test. In
one of this Note's recommendations, however, some of the specific problems with the special
needs test are identified. See infra notes 249-59 and accompanying text. Although the
problems of application may lie with the test itself and not with the failure of the Court to
apply it correctly, the Court nevertheless remains responsible for inconsistent application of
the test while rendering its decisions.
42 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
43 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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violated particular safety rules." The FRA used statistics to show that forty-two
fatalities and sixty-one injuries between 1972 and 1983 were attributable to
employees who had been under the influence of alcohol or drugs.45 These statistics
indicated that substance abuse was an identifiable problem in the railroad industry.
In 1985, the'FRA, in response to these statistics, implemented a program that
required any employee involved in a major train accident which caused either a
fatality, the release of hazardous material, or railroad property damage in excess of
$500,000, to provide blood and urine samples for testing.46 The Railway Labor
Executives' Association brought suit to prevent such samples from being taken.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California upheld
the FRA's position, and stated that the government's interest in both the safety of its
employees and the general public outweighed the privacy interest in one's own
body.47 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that the taking of
blood and urine samples constituted a Fourth Amendment search that, while not
necessarily requiring a warrant or probable cause, did require particularized suspicion
to be constitutionally valid.4" The Supreme Court granted certiorari and assumed the
task of defining how to apply the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to a
mandatory drug testing policy for certain predetermined actions.49 This was an issue
of first impression for the Court, and the 6-1-2 decision to reverse and allow the
suspicionless drug testing failed to provide anything other than general theories upon
which to rely in future cases. This failure fostered the lack of continuity which has
characterized the Court's suspicionless drug testing doctrine."
The Court dismissed the FRA's claim that the railroad regulations were a
"private initiative" and thus not subject to the Fourth Amendment." The Court
further stated that the Fourth Amendment would have applied if the regulation had
been promulgated by a private party acting as an agent of the government.52 After
an extensive analysis of case precedent, the Court determined that both the taking and
the testing of blood and urine samples constituted searches as defined under the
Fourth Amendment.53 The Court then acknowledged it could dismiss the warrant and

44 See Skinner, 489 U.S at 602.
41 See id. at 607.
46 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609-10.
17 See id. at 612.
48 See id. at 612-13. See also Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th
Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(holding that individualized suspicion was necessary because only "the combination of
observable symptoms of impairment with a positive result on a drug test would provide a
sound basis" for discipline.) Id. at 589.
'9 For an examination of Fourth Amendment issues, their relevance, and the Court's
unique application of Fourth Amendment tenets in its drug testing cases, see supra notes 1841 and accompanying text. For a more in-depth analysis, see 1-5 LAFAVE, supra note 21.
'o See infra notes 104-64 and accompanying text.
51 See Skinner, 489 U. S. at 614-15.
52 Id.
51 See Skinner, 489 U.S.'at 616-18; see also supra note
22.
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probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment if special needs made them
inapplicable. 54 Balancing the privacy rights of the individual with the compelling
interest of the government, the Court held that the special needs exception applied
because the intrusions created by drug testing were minimal compared to the safety
concerns underlying the FRA's drug testing policy. 5 The Court thus deemed the
drug testing policy constitutionally valid and, in doing so, tentatively established a
framework for deciding drug testing cases. Justice Scaliajoined the Skinner majority
in finding the drug testing policy legally permissible, but determined that the same
analysis required a different result in Skinner's companion case, Von Raab, in which
he dissented. 56
B. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab57
Von Raab, the companion case to Skinner, involved similar issues. The public
employees under scrutiny in Von Raab were employees of the United States Customs
Service, an agency administered by the Department of Treasury. The Customs
Service has a number of different responsibilities, but the duty in question in Von
Raab was the interception of contraband that included, but was not limited to, illegal
drugs. 8 In May 1986, Customs Service Commissioner William Von Raab
implemented a drug testing program for all employees who were to be promoted or
hired to serve in positions that involved drug interdiction, the carrying of firearms,
or the handling of classified material.5 9 The National Treasury Employees Union
brought suit to prevent the program from taking effect.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted the
Union's motion for an injunction because "the drug testing plan constitute[d] an
overly intrusive policy of searches and seizures without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, in violation of legitimate expectations of privacy. '60 The Fifth Circuit
See id.
at 619.
5 See id.
at 634.
While no procedure can identify all impaired employees with ease and perfect
accuracy, the FRA regulations supply an effective means of deterring employees
engaged in safety-sensitive tasks from using controlled substances or alcohol in
the first place.... By ensuring that employees in safety-sensitive positions know
they will be tested upon the occurrence of a triggering event, the timing of which
no employee can predict with certainty, the regulations significantly increase the
deterrent effect of the administrative penalties associated with the prohibited
conduct.
Id.
at 629-30.
56 See National Treas. Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U. S.656, 680 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
57489 U.S. 656 (1989).
58 See id at 659-60 (citing United States Customs Service, Customs U.S.A., Fiscal Year
1985, p.4).
5'See id.
at 660-61.
60 Id.at 662 (quoting National Treas. Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D.
14
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reversed, holding that the government had a "strong interest" in implementing such
a policy.6 The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision in part and held,
in a 5-4 decision, that the drug testing program was constitutional as it applied to
those employees involved in drug interdiction and those who were required to carry
firearms.62 It vacated the Fifth Circuit's ruling to the extent that it applied to
employees who handled classified materials, and remanded the case to the District
63

Court.

The Court clearly was less certain about the decision in this case than it was in
Skinner, as indicated by the divided Court, the two dissenting opinions, and the
holding that affirmed the drug testing policy in part, vacated it in part, and remanded
the case for further proceedings.64 It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia, who
agreed with the majority in Skinner, not only changed sides in Von Raab but
authored one of the two dissenting opinions. 61 Part III of this Note discusses Scalia's*
about-face, and its significance to the Court's suspicionless drug testing doctrine.66
The Court in Von Raab used much of the same precedent and much of the same
reasoning as it did in Skinner.67 In fact, the very first sentence of Part II of the Von
Raab opinion referred to the Skinner holding and used that decision to support the
view that "it follows that the Customs Service's drug-testing program must meet the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. '6' The Court determined that
the required urinalysis amounted to a search, again dismissed the usual Fourth
Amendment requirements of warrant and probable cause, and then engaged in special
needs balancing to determine that the drug testing program was constitutional under
the Fourth Amendment. 69 The Court did not require that there be a specific showing
La. 1986)). The Ninth Circuit took a similar position in its decision in Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n v. Bumley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Skinner v.

Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). The confusion that existed (and still
exists to a certain extent) regarding drug testing programs was possibly one of the reasons
the Court granted certiorari in Skinner and Von Raab.
61 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 664. The Fifth Circuit used a balancing test that nearly was
identical to the one the Court used in Skinner, and the same test was ultimately applied by
the Court in Von Raab.

See id. at 677.
See id. at 664-65.
64 See id. at 679.

62
63

65

See id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In my view the Customs Service rules are a kind

of immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use."). The
majority in Von Raab did not agree with Scalia's symbolism argument, but this line of

argument became the foundation for the majority decision eight years later in Chandler.See
Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997).
66 See infra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
67 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
68

Id. at 665. The Court relied-on Skinner to a substantial degree in deciding Von Raab,

most likely to provide the lower courts with a consistent framework for reviewing drug
testing policies. The Court's degree of success is questionable. See infra notes 104-64 and
accompanying text.
69 See id. at 666-68, 670-72. In supporting its argument, the Court stated:
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of drug-related problems with Customs Services employees." It determined,
however, that the program, as applied to employees who handled classified
information, was overbroad and thus unconstitutional. 7'
72
C. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton

Six years passed before the Supreme Court next addressed a drug testing policy.
Both the focus and forum were different than in previous cases-a school system,
rather than the federal government, implemented the policy, and the persons subject
to the drug testing were student athletes rather than public employees.
The Vernonia School District noticed a rise in drug use in schools that was
encouraged by its student athletes. 3 To counteract the problem, the District initiated
a program that would require randomly selected athletes to submit to drug tests. 4
Acton, a seventh-grade student, objected to the drug testing program as a violation
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.7 ' The Oregon District Court dismissed
the suit, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the program did violate the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the claims asserted by Acton, 76 and it issued a 5-1-3 opinion. Despite his Von
Raab dissent, Justice Scalia not only sided with the majority, but authored the
opinion. 77 He used the same framework and analysis relied upon by the majorities
in Skinner and Von Raab.78

It is readily apparent that the Government has a compelling interest in ensuring
that front-line interdiction personnel are physically fit, and have unimpeachable
integrity and judgment.... [Additionally,] the public should not bear the risk
that employees who may suffer from impaired perception and judgment will be
promoted to positions where they may need to employ deadly force.
Id. at 670-71.
70

See id at 673-74. This is an important point because the Court in Skinner partially

relied on the statistical existence of a problem in rendering its decision. After Von Raab, an
existing problem does not need to be identified if the government interest is sufficiently

compelling to outweigh the privacy interests of the individual.
7

See id at 678. Although the Court did indicate that employees who handle "sensitive"

information could be required to submit to a drug test, the application of the program at issue
in Von Raab to "Co-op Students" and "Animal Caretakers" was likely the basis for
characterizing the program as overbroad. See generally Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484
U.S. 518 (1988) (discussing the review procedures for an employee who holds a "sensitive"
position).
72 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
71 See id at 649.
74 See id. at 650.
71

See id at 651.

76

See id. at 652.
See id. at 647.

77

78 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-34 (1989); National
Treas. Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666-79 (1989); Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653-65 (1995).
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The Court recognized that the drug testing policy in question resulted in "a
'search' subject to the demands of the Fourth Amendment."79 It then addressed the
warrant and probable cause issue and, just as in Skinner and Von Raab, found that
although the suspicionless drug testing policy did not meet either requirement, it
nevertheless could be constitutional if it could pass the Court's special needs
balancing test."° The Court held the government did have a compelling interest in
ensuring that school athletes were drug-free, citing clinical journals and articles
which reported the problems of adolescent drug abuse."' Although it recognized
particularized suspicion was preferable in the Fourth Amendment context, the Court
once again found that the governmental interest outweighed an individual's right to
privacy."
D. Chandler v. Miller

3

The Chandlerdecision was the fourth case regarding a drug testing program for
which the Supreme Court granted review. 4 Unlike the three preceding cases,
however, the Court in Chandlerdid not agree with the testing policy in question. 5
Two years after the Vernonia decision, in which the Court expanded the rationale
for suspicionless drug testing by applying it to public schools, the Court in Chandler
examined the constitutionality of yet another forum for drug testing: state political
office. 6 In 1990, the Georgia legislature implemented a statute that required
"candidates for designated state offices to certify that they have taken a drug test and
that the test result was negative."" In order to satisfy the requirements of the statute,
7 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652.

See id at 653. The Court previously had determined that special needs existed in public
schools, and found that requiring a warrant "'would unduly interfere with the maintenance
of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures [that are] needed,' and 'strict adherence to
the requirement that searches be based on probable cause' would undercut 'the substantial
need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools."' Id.
(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985)).
8 See id. at 662. The Court remarked upon the State's duty to help the nation's children
live drug-free lives, stating that "the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that
this evil [drug use] is being visited not just upon individuals at large, but upon children for
whom it has undertaken a special responsibility of care and direction." Id.
82 See id. at 665 ("We find insufficient basis to contradict the judgment of Vernonia's
parents, its school board, and the District Court, as to what was reasonably in the interest of
these children under the circumstances.").
80

83

117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).

The other three cases are: Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995);
National Treas. Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor
Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
85 See Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1304-05. Whether the Court was successful in presenting
its rationale for the decision is addressed infra notes 104-240 and accompanying text.
84

86
87

See id. at 1298.

Id. The statute required the following state officers to submit to the test:
[T]he Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General,

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:1

each candidate was required to present a special certificate from a state-approved
laboratory that stated that the candidate was not using illegal drugs. 8 Petitioners
were candidates for the offices of Lieutenant Governor, Commissioner of
Agriculture, and member of the General Assembly, who challenged the statute as a
violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 9
In 1994, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied the
candidates' motion for a preliminary injunction and, in 1995, entered final judgment
upholding the drug testing policy.' The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, stating the statute
served special needs and that it was necessary to '"balance the individual's privacy
expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it [was]
impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the
particular context."' 9 The Court of Appeals determined that individualized
suspicion was impractical, and relied heavily on Supreme Court precedent in making
that determination. 92 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in an 8-1
decision. 93
Typical of its past approach to drug testing cases, the Court began its analysis
"with an uncontested point: Georgia's drug-testing requirement, imposed by law and
enforced by state officials, effects a search within the meaning of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments." 94 Because the Georgia statute did not allow for a warrant
based on probable cause, the Court proceeded to determine whether the law was
based on special needs that would make it constitutional. 95 Recognizing the drug
testing policy mandated by the statute was "in line with our precedents most
immediately in point: Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia,"96 the Court indicated it
would focus on these cases to determine the constitutionality of the statute. After a
State School Superintendent, Commissioner of Insurance, Commissioner of
Agriculture, Commissioner of Labor, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of
the Court of Appeals, judges of the superior courts, district attorneys, members
of the General Assembly, and members of the Public Service Commission.
GA CODE ANN. § 21-2-140(a)(4) (1993).
88 See Chandler, 117 S.Ct. at 1299.
See id.
90 See id.
89

" Id.
(quoting Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1996) (quoting National Treas.
Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989))).
92

93

See generally Chandler, 73 F.3d 1543.
Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1298.

9' Id.
at 1300. The Court relied on drug testing precedent (primarily Skinner) to declare
that any drug test is a search per se as defined by the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 22.
Once the Court finds a search it then must determine if such a search was reasonable.
9'See id. at 1301. Again relying on Skinner, the Court in Chandler stated that "'[i]n
limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated.., are minimal, and where an
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by
a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence
of such suspicion."' Id.
(quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U. S.602, 624
(1989).
96

Id.
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cursory examination of these precedents, however, the Court determined that the drug
testing policy at issue in Chandlerdid not qualify for the special needs exception
because it was "symbolic, 'not 'special,' as that term draws meaning from our case
law. 97 The Court thus declared the statute facially unconstitutional.
Because the Chandler decision was so different from those in Skinner, Von
Raab, and Vernonia,the Court had a responsibility to identify thoroughly either why
it departed from established precedent or why this case was so different from its
predecessors as to require the opposite ruling. 9 Although the Court may have been
on the right track by refusing to validate the "free-wheeling, fact-specific balancing
of costs and benefits" 99 required by the special needs test, Parts III and IV of this
Note will identify the reasons why the Chandlerdecision is legally unsupportable in
light of established precedent.'
It is also relevant that Justice Scalia (who voted to uphold the drug testing policy
in Skinner,'' to overturn in Von Raab,'0 2 and to uphold in Vernonia °3 ) sided with the
majority in Chandler to strike down the policy. The history of Scalia's
decisionmaking is indicative of the constitutional confusion that drug testing policies
often cause. Despite the 8-1 decision in Chandler,the near-unanimity of the Court
does not eliminate the confusion surrounding the constitutionality of suspicionless
drug testing.

III. CHANDLER V. MILLER-WHY A DIFFERENT RESULT?
In deciding Chandler,the Court acknowledged that drug tests are searches under
the Fourth Amendment and, in order for such tests to be constitutional without a
showing of individualized suspicion, they must satisfy the Court's special needs
balancing test."° The Court also declared that, in determining whether the special

9'Id.
at 1305. This rationale, and the reason it was flawed, will be discussed infra notes
104-64 and accompanying text.
9'8If the Court had decided Chandlerdifferently, it would have had to support its decision
by relying on relevant precedent, by effectively distinguishing the relevant precedent, or by
formally abandoning precedent to create new law. In Chandler,the Court ultimately was
unable to rely on any of these theories and, thus, its decision lacked a solid legal foundation.
'9 Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
ConstitutionalTheory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 22 (1988). It may be true that "balancing tests are
notoriously manipulable. For the very reason that they do not provide bright lines, they are
subject to slippage when the Court is under political pressure to crack down on criminals."
Id. at 48 (citations omitted). The Court has relied on special needs balancing in the past,
however, to decide suspicionless drug testing cases. It was thus incumbent upon the Court
to provide a better rationale for its Chandler decision.
'o See infra notes 104-259 and accompanying text.
iolSee 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
102 See 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
03
04

See 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
Chandler v.Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1301 (1997).
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needs exception applied, "[o]ur guides remain Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia."'' 5
Thus, to hold the special needs exception inapplicable to the drug testing policy in
question, the Court had to distinguish Chandler from its previous decisions
upholding drug testing policies. The Court was unsuccessful in doing so.
To support its departure from the traditional Fourth Amendment requirements
of warrant and probable cause, the Court consistently has relied on the special needs
exception.'" This "balancing method has permitted the Court to uphold warrantless
searches without any degree of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing."10 7 Some
commentators have commended the Court for its decision in Chandler,but have
complained that there is still no concrete test for determining when the special needs
framework applies.'0 ° The Court's reliance on a test that is difficult to apply
consistently likely contributed to the discrepancies present in the Chandler
decision."'

Sld. at 1303.
106 See

The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Leading Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1997)

[hereinafter Chandler Comment] (reviewing the Chandlerdecision and its purported reliance
on the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment). See also supra notes 18-41 and
accompanying text (discussing the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and the special
needs exception).

Wayne D. Holly, The FourthAmendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrectingthe
Warrant Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 537
(1997). In the footnote following this statement, Holly cited the following examples:
Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding random drug testing of
student athletes); Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990)
(upholding unannounced stops at sobriety checkpoints); National Treas. Emp. Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) (upholding random drug testing of Customs Service
officials); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703-04 (1987) (upholding administrative
searches); and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545-50 (1976) (upholding
routine stops at Border Patrol checkpoints). He then cited Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct.
1295 (1997) (disallowing drug testing for political candidates), as an example of a situation
in which special needs balancing is not suitable. See id. at 538 n.29.
108 See Chandler Comment, supranote 106, at 290, 298-99; Michael E. Brewer, Chandler
v. Miller: No Turning Back From a FourthAmendment ReasonablenessAnalysis, 75 DENV.
U. L. REV. 275, 292-93 (1997) (offering suggestions to improve the balancing test relied
upon by the Court in Chandler);Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, "SpecialNeeds" and the Fourth
Amendment. An Exception Poisedto Swallow the Warrant PreferenceRule, 32 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 529, 564 n.al (1997).
Although the Court reached the correct result, the Chandler opinion is in many
ways a step backwards rather than one forward. On one hand, Chandlermarks
the first time that the Court has applied a balancing test and yet concluded that
the significance of the government's interests did not trumpt [sic] the
individual's interest in privacy ....
On the other hand ..... .the Court's
application of a balancing test to determine reasonableness without first
identifying a special need is devastating.
107

Id.
109

See infra notes 110-64 and accompanying text.
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In Chandler,the issue was whether Georgia's drug testing program qualified as
a constitutionally acceptable special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment."'
The urinalysis required of particular candidates for political office clearly was a
search, 1 and because the search was not based on individualized suspicion, 112a
3
special need was necessary to legitimize the search mandated by the state statute."
The special need in Chandlerhad to identify a compelling, substantial, or important
governmental interest that would justify an intrusion upon an individual's right to
privacy-the very same requirements that were imposed in Skinner,"4 Von Raab,"5
and Vernonia."6 The Georgia legislature satisfied both requirements: its statute
called for a minimal intrusion upon an individual's privacy in order to fulfill the
compelling state interest that its political leaders be drug-free. Based on the
requirements of the special needs test and the case law established by Vernonia, Von
Raab, and Skinner, the Court in Chandler should have held the drug testing policy
in question to be constitutional.
The Court discussed the procedural history of the case and stated a special needs
exception was required for the program to be constitutional. The Court then
examined the "precedents most immediately in point: Skinner, Von Raab, and
Vernonia." 7 The Court recognized that the railway employees in Skinner had a
reduced expectation of privacy, and that the proposed urinalysis was minimally
intrusive." 8 When balanced with the "surpassing safety interests"" 9 of the state, the
Court in Skinner stated that special needs were present in enough force to support a
policy of drug testing without individualized suspicion. ° In Von Raab, there was

"0

See Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1301.

. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
112 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
''3 See Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1303 ("Our precedents establish that the proffered
special
need for drug testing must be substantial-important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal
requirement of individualized suspicion.").
"14 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) ("When faced with such special needs,
we have not hesitated
to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and
probable-cause requirements in the particular context.").
115 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) ("[W]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special
government needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance
the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether
it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the
particular context.").
16 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) ("A search unsupported by probable cause can be
constitutional, we have said, 'when special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable."' (quoting
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
''" Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1301.
118 See id (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626-27).
".9 Id (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634).
20 See id
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no demonstrated drug problem among the employees of the Customs Service,' 2 ' but
the possibility that "illicit drug users in such high-risk positions might be
unsympathetic to the Service's mission, tempted by bribes, or even threatened with
blackmail"' 22 was enough of a special need for the Court to uphold the suspicionless
drug testing policy. The Court upheld the drug testing policy in Vernonia because
of "the importance of deterring drug use by schoolchildren,"' 23 and noted that
"students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than
members of the population generally.' ' 124 It is important to highlight the various
findings on which the Court claimed to rely in Chandler. The inconsistencies
between those findings and the Chandlerdecision are inescapable.
To satisfy the special needs exception, the government must have a compelling
reason to interfere with a protected privacy interest.'25 The Court, in Chandler,
addressed the privacy issues presented by the drug testing of candidates for political
office, and found "the State could not be faulted for excessive intrusion.' 1 26 The
Court also declared that the drug testing program in Chandlerwas similar to those
approved by the Court in Skinner, 2 7 Von Raab,128 and Vernonia.'29 The Georgia

See id at 1302 (citing National Treas. Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660
(1989)).
22 Id (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668-7 1).
13 Id (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).
124 Id (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
'25 See supra notes 113-16.
126 Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1303.
127 489 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1989). After a "major train accident," all crew members and
other involved employees are transferred to a medical facility where blood and urine samples
are taken. The samples are then shipped to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
laboratory where they are analyzed for the presence of alcohol or other drugs. The FRA is
required to notify the employees of the test results and give them "an opportunity to respond
in writing before preparation of any final investigative report." Id at 609-10. "More
importantly, the expectations of privacy of covered employees are diminished by reason of
their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety ....

We

conclude, therefore, that the testing procedures.., pose only limited threats to the justifiable
expectations of privacy of covered employees." Id at 627-28.
128 489 U.S. 656, 663 (1989). An independent contractor sets the time and place for
collecting the urine sample, and "a monitor of the same sex as the employee remains close
at hand to listen for the normal sounds of urination." Id at 661. The sample is then sent to
a laboratory where it is tested for the presence of drugs. Test results will not be turned over
to any other agency without the employee's written consent. Id at 662-63. "We think
Customs employees.., have a diminished expectation of privacy in respect to the intrusions
occasioned by a urine test.... [W]e do not believe these expectations outweigh the Government's compelling interests in safety and in the integrity of our borders." Id at 672.
129 515 U.S. 646, 650-51 (1995). Athletes are tested at the beginning of the season
and,
throughout the season, 10% are selected randomly for testing once a week. Each athlete must
produce a urine sample while in the presence of a monitor, who listens "for normal sounds
of urination." Id The sample is then sent to an independent laboratory for analysis. If the
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statute allowed a candidate to provide a urine specimen at the office of a private
physician, and the candidate controlled whether the results would be released to the
public or to any law enforcement agencies. 3 The Court conceded the test did not
burden the candidates' privacy interests excessively, and then considered the issue
of whether there was a compelling interest to support the minor infringement of the
privacy interest. 3' The remainder of Part III of this Note will illustrate that the drug
testing policy in Chandler was not distinguishable enough from those in Skinner, Von
Raab, and Vernonia to warrant a different result.
Georgia defended its statute by stating that "the use of illegal drugs draws into
question an official's judgment and integrity; jeopardizes the discharge of public
functions, including antidrug law enforcement efforts; and undermines public
confidence and trust in elected officials."''
The Court held that these were not
compelling interests and stated there was no "concrete danger,"' 33 no "demonstrated
problem of drug abuse,"' 34 and the state could detect only those "prohibitively
addicted."' 35 The Court attempted to support this statement with precedent by
explaining that both Skinner and Vernonia involved policies directed at existing drug
problems.'36 The facts of Von Raab, however, did not involve existing drug
problems, and the Court acknowledged such problems were "not in all cases
necessary to the validity of a testing regime."' The Court also failed to explain why
the danger of a Customs Service official being bribed or becoming more susceptible38
to blackmail was a good reason to allow suspicionless drug testing in Von Raab,1
but the danger of impaired judgment of a potential state leader was insufficient to
3 9 Additionally, the Court never explained why
support drug testing in Chandler.'
identifying "prohibitively addicted" candidates was not a compelling interest, and
simply stated that ordinary law enforcement methods would be sufficient to control

results of the first test are positive for drugs, a second test is administered to confirm the
result. Only specified school personnel have access to the test results. See id "Legitimate
privacy expectations are even less [than the general student population] with regard to
student athletes .... [Based on] the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity

of the need met by the search-we conclude Vernonia's Policy is reasonable and hence
constitutional." Id.
at 661, 664-65.
30 See Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1303.
31
132

See id
Id

133 Id
134

Id.

Id.at 1304 (explaining that, because of the opportunity to schedule the test any
time-within thirty days of qualifying for the ballot-most drug users would be able to
abstain long enough to avoid detection).
"

136

See id at 1303.

137

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 122.
See supra text accompanying note 132.

131
139
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any problems. 4 ° One is left to wonder what methods states would employ so as to
identify future political candidates with severe drug addictions.
The Court remarked that Georgia "overlook[ed] a telling difference between the
facts of Von Raab and Georgia's candidate drug-testing program. 141 The Customs
Service did not subject employees in Von Raab to "the kind of day-to-day scrutiny
that is the norm in more traditional office environments,"' 42 while candidates for
public office "are subject to relentless scrutiny-by their peers, the public, and the
press. Their day-to-day conduct attracts attention notably beyond the norm in
ordinary work environments."' 43 This distinction, however, clearly indicates that
candidates for public office have a diminished expectation of privacy similar to that
of the public employees in Skinner'44 and Von Raab,45
' and the student athletes in
46
Vernonia.' The Court, again, proffered inconsistent arguments in Chandler by
proclaiming that it relied on its suspicionless drug testing case precedent.' 47 The
Court seemed to hold that a diminished expectation of privacy in Skinner and
Vernonia lent support to a suspicionless drug testing policy. It then purported to rely
on those decisions, however, in stating that the lesser degree of privacy enjoyed by
political candidates in Chandlerdid not lend support to Georgia's suspicionless drug
testing policy. The Court confused not only its precedent, but itself as well.'
It is also unclear why the Court in Chandlerrelied on the holding of Vernonia
if it wished to focus on "concrete danger."' 49 In Vernonia, there was no imminent
danger of the kind addressed by the Court in Skinner and Von Raab-only a desire
by the Court to address a drug problem that it found to be particularly detrimental to
the health of student athletes.' 0 The Court apparently believed that the nation was
See Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1304.
1304.
.42
Id. (quoting National Treas. Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989)).
143 id
141 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627
(1989) ("[T]he
40

14" Id. at

expectations of privacy of covered employees are diminished by reason of their participation

in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety.").
"41 See Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 (1989) ("We think Customs
employees who are
directly involved in the interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry firearms in
the line of duty likewise have a diminished expectation of privacy.").
46 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) ("There is an
additional respect in which school athletes have a reduced expectation of privacy. By
choosing to 'go out for the team,' they voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of
regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally.").
147 See

48

Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1303-04.

See also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) ("A State's operation of

a probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or its super-

vision of a regulated industry, likewise presents 'special needs' beyond normal law
enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause
requirements." (emphasis added)).
14" Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1303.
50 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995) ("That the nature of

the concern is important-indeed, perhaps compelling-can hardly be doubted. Deterring
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more interested in preventing student athletes from using drugs than it was in
ensuring that its political leaders be drug-free. The Court in Chandlerengaged in a
line-drawing exercise, but its attempt to rely on Vernonia to do so made little sense.
In Skinner and Von Raab the Court focused on the "safety-sensitive"'' nature
of the jobs performed by the persons subject to the drug testing policies as one of the
reasons to uphold the policies.'52 The policy at issue in Vernonia was constitutionally
acceptable to the Court because it helped to eliminate the "'role model' effect of
athletes' drug use."' 53 The Court, however, did not rely upon either of these
rationales in Chandler,nor did it effectively distinguish either rationale. Candidates
for public office were attempting to place themselves in "safety-sensitive"' 5 4 areas,
and the Court has acknowledged it is not a good idea to allow drug-influenced
officials access to particular areas of the government.'55 In striking down the drug
testing policy in Chandler,the Court also stated that "[w]hat is left, after close review
of Georgia's scheme, is the image the State seeks to project. By requiring candidates
for public office to submit to drug testing, Georgia displays its commitment to the
struggle against drug abuse."' 56 The Court held this, on its own, was an improper
purpose, and thus refused to accept a role model rationale-despite having done so
only two years before in Vernonia.'57
The special needs analysis by the Court does not support its conclusion that the
special needs exception was not warranted in Chandler. The inconsistencies between

the Chandlercase and the decisions in Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia make the
confusiori which embodies this area of the law more evident. The Court supposedly
drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is at least as important as enhancing efficient
enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs... or deterring drug use
by engineers and trainmen.") The danger presented by student athletes' drug use was not a
danger to public health or safety; it was simply a danger to the student athletes. The Court's
declaration of a compelling interest in Vernonia is as symbolic as Georgia's attempt to ensure
that candidates for high office are not using drugs, regardless of the way the Court tried to
differentiate its rationale in Chandler.
'5' Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 (1989).
52 See id; see also National Treas. Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668-69
(1989) (explaining that nine agents died while on duty).
...Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663. The Court indicated that, because "student athletes are
admired in their schools and in the community" and are "the leaders of the drug culture,"
other students would be influenced to use illegal drugs. Id. at 648-49; see also Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Ore. 1992) (stating that athletes would have
"a significant poisoning impact upon the broader student population").
'14 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629; see also supra text accompanying
note 151.
115 Cf Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) ("' [T]here is reasonable
basis for the view that an agency head who must bear the responsibility for the protection of
classified information committed to his custody should have the final say."'(quoting Cole v.
Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546 (1956))). To allow an official on drugs to have the "final say" with

regards to particularly sensitive matters clearly is not in the best interests of public safety or
general well-being.
56 Chandler v. Miller, 17 S. Ct. 1295, 1304 (1997).
5 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663.
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decided each of the four cases-Chandler,Vernonia, Von Raab, and Skinner-within
the special needs framework, which it then applied or not applied based on the facts
of each case. As Justice Scalia's decisions make clear, consistently interpreting and
applying the special needs test in suspicionless drug testing is not an easy task for the
Court. It is a much more difficult chore for the lower courts, which are expected to
apply the Supreme Court's muddled interpretations.
In Skinner, Justice Scalia agreed with the six-member majority in concluding a
suspicionless drug testing policy applicable to railroad employees served a
compelling governmental interest without undue intrusion into individual privacy
rights, and was therefore constitutional.' 58 In Skinner's companion case, Von Raab,
Scalia argued that the drug testing policy was unconstitutional and authored one of
the dissenting opinions, stating that "[t]he only pertinent points, it seems to me, are
159
supported by nothing but speculation, and not very plausible speculation at that."'
Nevertheless, reliance on speculation served Scalia well when he authored the fivemember majority opinion in Vernonia six years later."' In his Vernonia opinion,
Scalia devoted almost two full pages to the potential adverse effects of drug use, the
possibility of lawsuits, an'i the expanded roles of schoolteachers that would
materialize if the suspicionless drug testing policy was not upheld. 6 ' Most recently,
Scaliajoined seven other members of the Court in Chandlerto strike down a Georgia
statute that allowed for suspicionless drug testing of candidates for political office.' 62
Scalia apparently believed that the "symbolic"' 63 nature of this drug testing policy
clearly was distinguishable from his "role model"'" rationale in Vernonia. Scalia's
decisions indicate that predicting the manner in which the Court will react to the next
suspicionless drug testing policy is difficult, if not impossible.
IV. AFTERMATH OF CHANDLER-WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
The Supreme Court decided Chandlerv. Miller on April 15, 1997.165 Since that
date, courts have distinguished the decision once, 66 judicially examined it six
times, 16 7 discussed it ten times, 168 and cited it thirteen times.'69 Although not all of
5 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602-34.
9 National Treas. Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 682 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
60 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 646-66.
161

See id. at 661-64.

162

See Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1295-1305 (1997).

163Id. at
64
165

166

1305.

Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663; see supra note 153 and accompanying text.
See Chandler, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
Pilkington Barnes Hind v. Sup. Ct., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 599 n.4 (Cal. App. I Dist.

1998) (noting that the Chandler decision did not forbid suspicionless drug testing of job
applicants by a private employer).
167 See Knox County Educ. Ass'n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., Nos. 97-5405, 97-5408,
1998 WL 663336, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 29, 1998) (stating that suspicionless drug testing of
school teachers and administrators was constitutional); 19 Solid Waste Dep't Mechanics v.
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City of Albuquerque, No. 96-2177, 1998 WL 646876, at *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 22, 1998)
(asserting that suspicionless drug testing of employees applying for license renewal was not
based on a special need); Willis v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., No. 98-1227, 1998 WL
569114, at * 1 (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 1998) (declaring that the school drug testing policy was not
based on individualized suspicion and did not qualify for the special needs exception to the
Fourth Amendment); Aubrey v. School Bd. of Lafayette Parish, 148 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 1998)
(explaining that the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment justified suspicionless
drug testing of employees deemed to be in safety sensitive positions); Pierce v. Smith, 117
F.3d 866 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that a suspicionless drug testing policy, as applied to a
physician was constitutional as a special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment); New
Jersey Transit PBA Local 304 v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 701 A.2d 1243 (N.J. 1997)
(adopting the special needs balancing test to determine the constitutionality of random drug
testing).
6 See DesRoches v. Caprio, No. 97-2173, 1998 WL 652338, at *3-*4 (4th Cir. Sept. 23,
1998), rev'g DesRoches v. Caprio, 974 F. Supp. 542, 547-48 (E.D. Va. 1997) (stating that
individualized suspicion was required to search a student's backpack and that such
individualized suspicion existed); United Teachers of New Orleans v. Orleans Parish Sch.
Bd., 142 F.3d 853, 856 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a regulation requiring employees injured
on the job to submit to a drug test did not qualify for the special needs exception to Fourth
Amendment); Norwood v. Bain, 143 F.3d 843, 859-60, 862 (4th Cir. 1998) (Wilkins, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that special needs justified the search of motorcyclists' unworn clothing
and saddlebags); Berthiaume v. Caron, 142 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Chandlerto
support the argument that drug testing is a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment); Makula v. Village of Schiller Park, No. 95 C 2400, 1998 WL 246043, at *6
(N.D. III. Apr. 30, 1998) (granting partial summary judgment to plaintiff with regard to
involuntary searches); Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 805-06 (S.D. Ind. 1997),
reh'g denied en banc, Todd v. Rush County Sch., 139 F.3d 571, 571-73 (7th Cir. 1998)
(stating that evidence of drug use indicated a special need for a random drug testing policy
for students participating in extracurricular activities); Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez,
No. 97SC124, 1998 WL 373305, at *13, *18 (Colo. June 29, 1998) (declaring that a
suspicionless drug testing policy applied to students in extracurricular activities does not
qualify for the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment); State v. Zeta Chi Frat.,
696 A.2d 530, 542-44 (N.H. 1997) cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 558 (1997) (holding that random
warrantless searches by a probation officer were constitutional); In re J.G., 701 A.2d 1260,
1265-67 (N.J. 1997) (declaring that state statutes requiring suspicionless AIDS testing of sex
offenders was a constitutional special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment); Jaramillo
v. City of Albuquerque, 958 P.2d 1244, 1246-47 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
suspicionless drug testing of employees who were not operating heavy vehicles did not
qualify for the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment).
169 See Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that the
city's method of random drug testing, as it pertained to firefighters, did not violate the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Ward, 131 F.3d 335, 342 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that a
requirement for a defendant to submit to an HIV test did not violate his Fourth Amendment
rights); Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 853 (9th Cir. 1997), affg Bates v. Jones, 958 F. Supp.
1446, 1465 (N.D. Cal. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1302 (1998) (holding that lifetime
legislative term limits violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Lucero v. Trosch, 121
F.3d 591, 598 (11 th Cir. 1997) (holding that some of the provisions enjoining anti-abortion
protesters did not violate the First Amendment (citing Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543,
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these references to Chandlerare relevant to this Note, the decisions rendered by the
courts that have examined Chandlerin detail indicate that the Chandlerdecision has
not systematically precluded lower courts from finding suspicionless drug testing
policies to be constitutional. 7 Even though each of the six decisions analyzed below
discuss Chandler,and likely could have relied on Chandler-stylesymbolism and lack
of a compelling interest to strike down the particular drug testing policy, the majority
of the courts in question relied on the Skinner-Von Raab-Vernonia rationale to
uphold the policy. Since Chandler was decided, only two lower courts which
examined that decision have chosen to rely on it to strike down the challenged drug
testing policy before them.' 7'
Three months after the Supreme Court decided Chandler,the Fifth Circuit, in
Pierce v. Smith, 7 2 became the first court to thoroughly examine that decision. The
plaintiff-appellee, Diane Pierce, was a medical resident at the Texas Tech University
Health Science Center ("TTUHSC"), and was serving a two month rotation at St.
Joseph's Hospital.'73 After an incident in which she "hard slapped" an uncooperative
patient, TTUHSC required Pierce to undergo psychiatric evaluations and a
urinalysis.' 74 Pierce brought suit against TTUHSC officials. The District Court jury
entered a verdict for Pierce based on thejury instruction that individualized suspicion

1546 n.3 (1 th Cir. 1996))); Johnson v. City of Harvey, No. 95 C 7687, 1998 WL 381702,
at *8 (N.D. I11.June 30, 1998) (holding that no special need existed to justify the search of
a locker or the arrest of plaintiff); Dwan v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., No. CIV.A.9512430-GAO, 1998 WL 151242, at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 20, 1998) (explaining that a drug
testing program for government employees need not require individualized suspicion to be
constitutional); Medina v. City of Osawatomie, 992 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (D. Kan. 1998)
(finding that publication of plaintiffs status as a convicted felon did not violate his
constitutional rights); Green v. Mortham, 989 F. Supp. 1451, 1454 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (stating
that state requirements for appearance on an election ballot are not unconstitutional); United

States ex rel. Felton v. Allflex USA, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 259, 260 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997)
(relying on Chandlerfor the proposition that policymaking should be left to the legislatures);
State v. Peters, 941 P.2d 228, 232 (Ariz. 1997) (stating that squeezing and sniffing of

luggage was not an unconstitutional search); Cole v. State, 714 So. 2d 479, 489 (Fla. App.
2 Dist. 1998) (holding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to enforce its drug abuse
treatment order which violated defendant's due process rights); Reames v. Department of

Pub. Works, 707 A.2d 1377, 1379 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (holding that a random
drug testing policy was unconstitutional because had not established protocol for
administering the test); State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Tenn. 1997) (explaining that
a police officer's decision to stop a vehicle was constitutional).
70 See infra note 239.
...See Willis v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., No. 98-1227, 1998 WL 569114, at *1

(7th Cir. Sept. 9, 1998); 19 Solid Waste Dep't Mechanics v. City of Albuquerque, No. 962177, 1998 WL 646876, at *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 22, 1998).
72

171
174

117 F.3d 866 (5th Cir. 1997).

See id at 868.
Id. at 868-69.
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was required before a drug test could be mandated.' 75 The TTUHSC officials
appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.' 76
The Fifth Circuit cited Skinner, Von Raab, Vernonia, and Chandlerto support

its holding that a urinalysis clearly was a constitutionally-protected search, and that,
in order for such a search to be permissible, it must qualify as a special needs
exception to the Fourth Amendment.' 77 The Fifth Circuit believed that "[p]lainly,
this is a 'special needs' case. It is clear that the.., challenged search [in Pierce] was
'not designed to 'serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement', . . . and no law

enforcement personnel were in any way involved."' 78 The court held that after
performing "'a context specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private and
public interests,"". 79 there was no reason to require individualized suspicion for the
drug test at issue in this case. The court held Pierce had a diminished expectation of
privacy,"' and stated there was no need to show that there was a previously
established drug testing policy in place in order for the special needs exception to
apply.' 8' Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court ruling and upheld
the right of TTUHSC to require a urinalysis from Pierce.8 2
One can only wonder how the Supreme Court would have decided this case. The
Court likely would have acknowledged that the special needs test was appropriate,
because the Court relied on that test in each of its four previous suspicionless drug
testing cases.8 3 The Court also likely would have approved of the privacy analysis
by which the Fifth Circuit determined that the intrusiveness of the drug test on
171

See id.at 870.

176See

id

7 See id.at 872-74.
78 Id. at 874 (citation omitted).
17

Id. at 877 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1301 (1997)).

0 See id.at 874.

See id. at 879 ("[T]he presence of a testing policy would not have materially
ameliorated the situation from the point of view of one in Dr. Pierce's position."). The fact
that the Supreme Court never has addressed this question provides yet another example of
how little guidance the lower courts have in deciding suspicionless drug testing cases.
'

82
183

See id. at 880.
See Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1301 ("When such 'special needs'-concerns other than

crime detection-are alleged in justification of a Fourth Amendment intrusion, courts must

undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private and public
interests advanced by the parties."); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653
(1995) ("We have found such 'special needs' to exist in the public school context.");
National Treas. Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) ("[W]here a Fourth
Amendment intrusion serves special government needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the
Government's interests to determine whether it is impracticable to require a warrant or some
level of individualized suspicion in the particular context."); Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec.
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) ("The Government's interest in regulating the conduct of
railroad employees to ensure safety... 'likewise presents "special needs" beyond normal law
enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause
requirements."' (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987))).
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Pierce's privacy was minor compared to the state interest in ensuring physicians are
not under the influence of illegal drugs.'84 Although the Court may have approved
of the methods, however, it could have deemed the drug test in Pierce to be just as
"symbolic" as the drug testing policy in Chandler.'8 5 In Chandler, the Court
exacerbated the problems of the already convoluted special needs test by failing to
distinguish Chandler effectively from the other drug testing cases. Whether the
Court would use the Skinner- Von Raab- Vernonia rationale and uphold a drug testing
policy, or whether it would rely on the Chandlerrationale and declare the policy
"symbolic," is a question the lower courts must address with very little guidance from
the Court.
Several months after the decision in Pierce; the New Jersey Supreme Court
acknowledged Chandler in deciding New Jersey Transit PBA Local 304 v. New

Jersey Transit Corp.8 6 Pursuant to an established policy, all transit employees in
"safety sensitive" functions were subject to random drug testing in order to "ensure
that NJ TRANSIT operates in the safest and most efficient manner possible and to
promote the safety and welfare of our employees and customers by creating a drug
and alcohol-free workplace and ensuring that our employees are free from the effects
of drugs and alcohol."' 87 The union representing the transit police brought suit, and
claimed the testing was "an illegal search and seizure."' 88 The state trial and
appellate courts each upheld the drug testing policy, and the case was appealed to the
New Jersey supreme court.' 89
The state supreme court, like the Fifth Circuit in Pierce, relied extensively on
Skinner, Von Raab, Vernonia, and Chandlerto hold that the drug testing policy in

question was constitutional. 9 ' The court agreed the special needs balancing test

184 The

Fifth Circuit referred to the Court's primary drug testing decisions in concluding
that the privacy intrusion was acceptable. See Pierce, 117 F.3d at 875 ("Taking into account
all the factors we have considered above-the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative
unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met by the search ...

." (quoting

Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663)); Id.
at 875 ("[E]mployees [such as Pierce] 'reasonably should
expect effective inquiry into their fitness and probity."' (quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S. at
671)); Id.
at n. 10 ("[R]ailway employers 'by reason of their participation in an industry that
is regulated pervasively to ensure safety' had diminished expectations of privacy." (quoting
Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1301 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627))).
185 Chandler, 117 S.
Ct. at 1305 ("The need revealed, in short, is symbolic, not 'special,'
as that term draws meaning from our case law.").
186 701 A.2d 1243 (N. J. 1997). The Fourth Amendment is applied in this case because
the
New Jersey Transit Corporation receives federal funding, thus making it subject to the federal
Constitution.
187Id. at 1246.
88
'8

Id at 1248.

See id.
The Appellate Division formally "adopted the special needs balancing test of

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'Ass 'n and National TreasuryEmployees Union v. Von
Raab." Id (citations omitted). See New Jersey Transit PBA Local 304 v. New Jersey Transit
Corp., 675 A.2d 1180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
'90See New Jersey Transit Corp., 701 A.2d at 1251-55.
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should be adopted and applied in Pierce because the drug testing policy "limits the
intrusion on transit officers' privacy interests, and .. .because of their law

enforcement status, transit police officers have a diminished expectation of
privacy."'' The court further held that "[t]he government also has a compelling
interest in ensuring that its drug enforcement authorities are themselves drug-free."' 92
Finding the special needs test satisfied, the court affirmed the lower courts' holding
that the drug testing policy did not violate the Fourth Amendment.' 93
The New Jersey supreme court made a concerted effort to pattern its decision
after Von Raab because random testing of customs officials and transit police officers
raised similar concerns. 94 The United States Supreme Court, as it likely would have
done in deciding Pierce, probably would have approved of the court's focus on the
special needs test and its application' 95-but it is unclear whether the Court would
have relied on Chandler or Von Raab to decide the case. The history of the Court's
drug testing decisions provides little guidance with which to answer dilemma. The
state supreme court decision was well-reasoned and grounded in unrenounced Court
precedent, but the Court's Chandler decision makes even the most logical
applications of suspicionless drug testing doctrine questionable.' 96
After New Jersey Transit, over a year passed before the judiciary referred to
Chandler with more than a footnote or several brief sentences. When the Fifth
Circuit did so in Aubrey v. School BoardofLafayette Parish,197the resulting decision
echoed that same court's reasoning in Pierce. The court quoted extensively from
Skinner, Von Raab, Vernonia, and Chandler,and stated that "unlike Chandler, the
special need in this case is substantially more than symbolic or a desire to project a
public image."' 98 In holding that the special needs exception to the Fourth
Amendment was applicable, the court was influenced by the stated intent of the drug
testing program to "prevent drug users from obtaining a safety sensitive position" 99
and the "school system's role as a guardian." ' 0 Although the lone dissenting judge
191 Id. at

1258.
192 Id. at 1259.
' See id.
at 1259-60.

See id at 1257-59.
'9' See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
196See Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1305.
'94

"' 148 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 1998).
...Id at 564.
199Id.at 563-64. The drug user in the "safety sensitive" position was a school custodian.
Ironically, although the Supreme Court in Chandlerheld that Georgia's elected officials "do
not perform high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks," see Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1305
(1997), the Fifth Circuit in Aubrey was not at all deterred from holding that a custodian does
perform such tasks because he "interact[s] regularly with students." Aubrey, 148 F.3d at 565.
200 Id.at 564. The comparison with the decision in Aubrey and the rationale for the Court's
decision in Vernonia is inevitable. The Fifth Circuit even stated that "the most significant
element in both this case and Acton [Vernonia] is that 'the Policy was undertaken in
furtherance of the government's responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian
and tutor of children entrusted to its care."' Id.(quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
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did not believe that the special needs exception was applicable,"° ' the majority was
able to support its assertions by citing to the Supreme Court cases directly on point:
Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia. The court simply distinguished Chandler. Once
again, the Chandlerdecision failed to influence a lower court's determination of the
constitutionality of a suspicionless drug testing policy.
The Sixth Circuit, in Knox County Education Ass 'n v. Knox County Board of
Education,' joined the ranks of New Jersey and the Fifth Circuit by deciding to
distinguish Chandler in order to work with the Skinner-Von Raab-Vernonialine of
cases. In Knox County, the Knox County Education Association ("KCEA")
challenged the drug testing policy instituted by the Knox County Board of Education
("Board").2 3 The drug testing policy provided for suspicionless drug testing and
suspicion-based alcohol testing of all school personnel who were employed in "safety
sensitive" positions.2" 4 The district court held the policy25violated the Fourth
Amendment, and the case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit.

On appeal, the Board insisted civil procedure concerns should dictate a reversal
of the district court decision.20 6 Although the Sixth Circuit was not willing to
summarily recognize these civil procedure claims, it acknowledged that "a crucial
issue is whether teachers are 'safety sensitive' employees-a question which the
Board claims has already been resolved. 20 7 After a thorough analysis of the district
court's opinion and the testing procedures in question,0 8 the Sixth Circuit began its
own analysis with a brief overview ofthe drug testing precedent: Skinner, Von Raab,
Vernonia, and Chandler."9 The court seemed to be particularly influenced by the
Von Raab holding, stating that "[w]e can imagine few governmental interests more
important to a community than that of insuring the safety and security of its children
while they are entrusted to the care of teachers and administrators.

21 0

The court also

quoted Skinner's warning "'that even a momentary lapse of attention can have

515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995)).
201 See id at 565 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
202 1998 WL 663336, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 29, 1998).
203 See id
204

ld

205

See id at * 1-*2.

206

See id. at * 1. The Board argued that the 1994 case referred to as "KCEA I" was

binding, under the doctrines ofresjudicata and collateral estoppel, with regard to its findings
on "safety sensitive" positions in the Knox County school system. Id.
207

Id. at *4.

208 See id at *4-*9.
2109Seeid. at*10-*12.
210

Id. at * 14. The court attempted to distinguish this compelling governmental interest

from that rejected in Chandler, noting that "[t]eachers and administrators are not some
distant societal role models, as in the case of the Georgia political candidates in Chandler."
Id. Although Chandler rejected a role model rationale for upholding suspicionless drug
testing, see Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1305, the Sixth Circuit chose to adopt such a rationale
nevertheless by apparently relying on the unrenounced holding of Vernonia rather than the
more recent Chandlerdecision.
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disastrous consequences,"' in support of its contention that employment as a teacher
211

constituted a safety sensitive position that warranted suspicionless drug testing.
The Sixth Circuit concluded its analysis by stating that people who serve as school
teachers and administrators have a privacy interest that is "significantly
diminished... by the level of regulation of their jobs and by the nature of the work
itself. ' 21 2 Having thus satisfied the two prongs of the special needs test, the court
213
reversed the district court and upheld the Board's suspicionless drug testing policy.
The Sixth Circuit in Knox County cited a portion of the Chandler decision,
which in turn cited portions of the Skinner and Von Raab decisions, to show the
accepted method for analyzing suspicionless drug testing cases was the application
of the special needs balancing test.2 4 Because the cited cases are Supreme Court
precedent, it would have been difficult for the court to deny that the special needs test
provided the proper framework for analysis. It is evident from the decision in Knox
County, however, that the Sixth Circuit wanted to rely on the Skinner-Von RaabVernonia triad rather than the Chandler decision. The language of the court's
decision highlighted some of the inconsistencies between Chandlerand the rationale
adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Knox County."5 Lower courts are not supposed to
selectively apply Supreme Court precedent-but in the suspicionless drug testing
context, that is the trend which appears to be developing after Chandler.
Of the six courts that have judicially examined Chandler,two have chosen to
strike down the suspicionless drug testing policy at issue. In Willis v. Anderson
Community School Corp.,21 6 the School Corporation required that any student
217
suspended for more than a three-day period be tested for drug and alcohol use.
James Willis, an Anderson high school student suspended for fighting, challenged
8
the drug testing policy as a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."
The district court 9upheld the policy as constitutional, and Willis appealed to the
21
Seventh Circuit.
Although the School Corporation believed that Willis' conduct created
individualized suspicion, the Seventh Circuit did not believe "that the Corporation's
Knox County, 1998 WL 663336, at *18 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec.
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989) (referring to railroad engineers)). It appears that the Sixth
Circuit would rather favorably compare teachers to railway employees than be forced to rely
on Chandlerto reject the drug testing policy at issue.
21'

22 Id at *25.
213

See id

214

See id. at*12-*13.
at * 18 ("[W]e do not read the definition of 'safety sensitive' so narrowly
See, e.g., id.

215

as to preclude application to a group of professionals to whom we entrust young children.").
The Sixth Circuit had to ignore that the Supreme Court, in Chandler, decided to read the
definition of "safety sensitive" to preclude application to those individuals to whom an entire
state government would be entrusted.
26 No. 98-1227, 1998 WL 569114, at *1 (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 1998).
217 See id
218
219

See id.
See id
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data [was] strong enough to conclusively establish reasonable suspicion of substance
abuse when a student is suspended for fighting., 22' The court then stated the drug
testing policy still could be constitutional if it satisfied special needs, thus
acknowledging the Supreme Court's holdings in Skinner, Von Raab, Vernonia, and
Chandler. Perhaps because of the public school context, the court focused much
of its analysis on "each of the factors set forth in Vernonia. '222 Although the Seventh
Circuit did not believe the compelling interest of the School Corporation was of a
lesser degree than the compelling interest held to exist in Vernonia,223 the court stated
Willis did not "voluntarily engag[e] in misconduct-at least not as the term
'voluntary' is used in Vernonia. 2 24 The court concluded that because suspicionbased drug testing was a viable option for the School Corporation,225 the "imposition
of a suspicionless policy seems to serve primarily demonstrative or symbolic
purposes.." 2 6 Because the testing was not based on individualized suspicion, and
because the special needs exception was held to be inapplicable, the court reversed
227
the district court and struck down the drug testing policy.
In 19 Solid Waste DepartmentMechanics v. City ofAlbuquerque,228 the Tenth

Circuit relied heavily on Chandler in affirming the district court's decision to
overturn the city's suspicionless drug testing policy. Although it briefly mentioned
the decisions in Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia,the Tenth Circuit "turn[ed] to the
details of Chandler to understand what the government's special need showing
requires.

2'29

The court noted that because the mechanics in question were tested only

when their commercial drivers' licenses were renewed every four years, the drug

Id. at *3.
See id at *4.
222 Id. at *5.
223 See id at *7.
224 Id at *6. In Vernonia, "the Court noted a series of steps that an athlete had to take in
order to compete-submitting to a preseason physical, maintaining a minimum grade point
average, attending practices, etc." Id. (citing Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
220

221

657 (1995)). The actions required to engage in fighting, as Willis had done in the instant
case, were not of the same voluntary nature.
225 See Willis, 1998 WL 569114, at *9.
226 Id. at *8 (citing Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997)).
227 See Willis, 1998 WL 569114, at *8-*9.
228 No. 96-2117, 1998 WL 646876, at *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 22, 1998).
229 Id. at *3. In its discussion of the Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia decisions, the court
explained that the constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing programs was determined
by balancing the intrusion of an individual's privacy interests against the existence of
legitimate governmental interests. Id. When it discussed the Chandlerdecision, however, the
Tenth Circuit stated that the Court "added a step to the analysis it had followed in Skinner,
Von Raab, and Vernonia." Id. It identified this "added step" as the special needs test, which
implies mistakenly that the special needs test was not considered in the drug testing cases
prior to Chandler. This may explain why the Tenth Circuit focused so heavily on Chandler.
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testing policy was similar to that in Chandler because it lacked "any deterrent
effect."23 The court thus held that because there was no effective deterrence, there
was no special need for suspicionless drug testing."'
Both Willis and Solid Waste Mechanics indicate that the lower courts have not
entirely ignored the Chandlerdecision. Even though the Seventh and Tenth Circuits
struck down the drug testing policies in question after examining Chandler,however,
the Chandler decision still appears unconvincing. The Seventh Circuit, in Willis,
could have struck down the drug testing policy by relying solely on the
distinguishable aspects of Vernonia.232 The Tenth Circuit's reliance on Chandler
was suspect because the court believed that decision "added" the inquiry of "whether
the drug-testing program at issue is warranted by a 'special need.'" 233 Neither court's
reference to Chandleris particularly compelling, and the decisions rendered by these
courts indicate that what Chandlerhas added to the Court's drug testing precedent
is a degree of discord rather than harmony.
Some legal scholars adhere to the theory that any comprehensive attempt to
rationalize Supreme Court decisions ultimately is futile because the Court will always
'
render decisions like Chandler."' This theory, known as "Critical Legal Studies,"235
demonstrates "the inability of doctrinal analysis to produce results that are
independent of the prior pred[i]l[e]ctions [sic] of the judge or academic doing the
' Proponents of this theory would assert the backgrounds and experiences
analysis."236
of Supreme Court Justices predetermine the decisions of the entire Court. This
contention presents an interesting rationale for Scalia's irreconcilable decisions in the
drug testing context. Critical legal theorists ask "only that judges not delude
themselves into thinking that what they do has significance different from, and
'
broader than, what every other political actor does." 237
Perhaps the Court in Chandlerwas exerting its own political muscle by not
allowing Georgia to take advantage of a Court that has been a regular proponent of
states' rights over the last several years. It may be true that "no court can create a
Id.at *6. In Chandler,the advance notice provided to political candidates before the
drug test was administered made it too easy for drug users to avoid detection. Id.(citing
Chandler v. Miller, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1304 (1997)).
231 See id.
232 See Willis v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., No. 98-1227, 1998 WL 569114, at *7
(7th Cir. Sept. 9, 1998) ("[T]here is sharp contrast between the efficacy of the policy in
ernonia... and the efficacy of the policy in this case.").
233 19 Solid Waste Dep't Mechanics v. City of Albuquerque, No. 96-2117, 1998 WL
646876, at *3 (10th Cir. Sept. 22, 1998). See also supra note 229.
230

234

See generally MICHAEL J.GERHARDT AND THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL

THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 245-70 (1993) (discussing the meaning and impact
of Critical Legal Studies).
235 Id. at 245.
236 Id.(quoting Mark V. Tushnet, Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies: Introduction,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 239, 239 (1984)).
237 Id. at 258 (quoting Mark V. Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism,42
OHIO ST. L.J. 411,425-26 (1981)).
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precedent that will inexorably bind its successors; the decision to be bound must be
made by the successors themselves. 2 38 If the Supreme Court's successors (or the
current Court in a different context), however, choose not to be bound by precedent,
they would be wise to defend their departure from such precedent more effectively
than the Court did in Chandler.
Subsequent decisions by the lower courts have illustrated that the Chandler
decision has not dissuaded courts from upholding suspicionless drug testing
policies." It is surprising, however, that the inconsistencies with relevant precedent
present in Chandler have not drawn more attention. 2" As an attempt to remedy
future inconsistencies in applying the special needs balancing test, this Note presents
two recommendations.
2 41
A. Abandon or Limit the Decision in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton

This decision was as symbolic as the Chandlerdecision, perhaps even more so.
By not relying on a decision that was, for the most part, indistinguishable from that
in Chandler,the Court could add a degree of legitimacy to the Chandler decision.
The Vernonia decision marked "the first time that the United States Supreme
Court has addressed the issue of drug testing in the public schools.

2 42

The rationale

used to support this issue of first impression for the Court, however, was not as solid
as those used to support Vernonia's predecessors, Von Raab and Skinner, and the
243 In
decision rested on a premise little different from the one rejected in Chandler.
Von Raab and Skinner the Court upheld the drug testing policy in question because
of the substantial public safety concerns posed by customs officials and railway
employees under the influence of illegal narcotics, and noted both classes of
employees enjoyed a diminished expectation of privacy. 44 The student athletes in
Vernonia also enjoyed a diminished expectation of privacy, but the rationale for the
suspicionless drug testing policy was to prevent the "'role model' effect of athletes'
drug use" 24 5-hardly the "compelling state interest" required by the special needs
238

Id.

239

See, e.g., Aubrey v. School Bd. of Lafayette Parish, 148 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 1998);

Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866 (5th Cir. 1997); Knox County Educ. Ass'n v. Knox County
Bd. of Educ., Nos. 97-5405, 97-5408, 1998 WL 663336, at * 1 (6th Cir. Sept. 29, 1998); New
Jersey Transit PBA Local 304 v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 701 A.2d 1243 (N.J. 1997). But
cf Willis v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., No. 98-1227, 1998 WL 569114, at *1 (7th
Cir. Sept. 9, 1998); 19 Solid Waste Dep't Mechanics v. City of Albuquerque, No. 96-2177,
1998 WL 646876, at *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 22, 1998).
240 See supra notes 104-64 and accompanying text.
241

515 U.S. 646 (1995).

242

Denise E. Joubert, Note, Message in a Bottle: The United States Supreme Court

Decision in Vemonia School District 47J v. Acton, 56 LA. L. REV. 959, 979 (1996).
243 See supra notes 104-64 and accompanying text.
244 See National Treas. Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S 656, 679 (1989); Skinner v.
Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S 602, 634 (1989).
245

Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663.
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balancing test, particularly when compared to the rationales in Von Raab and
Skinner.
When the Vernonia decision is compared to the Chandlerdecision, the Court's
inconsistencies are even more pronounced. The Court in Chandler indicated that
candidates for political office have a diminished expectation of privacy,246 but then
'
is not enough of a rationale to
held that "the image the State seeks to project"247
establish a compelling state interest. The Court in Chandlerthus rejected the idea
that a diminished expectation of privacy and a role model rationale were sufficient
to satisfy the "special needs" test-yet itfound thatsame diminishedexpectation and
rationaleto be satisfactory in Vernonia. Such a glaring inconsistency makes the
Chandler decision judicially suspect.
For consistency and clarity, the Court should abandon the Vernonia decision and
exclude it from its suspicionless drug testing doctrine. Alternatively, the Court
simply should limit the decision to the school context,248 thereby making Skinner,
Von Raab, and Chandlerthe relevant precedent for other suspicionless drug testing
cases. Regardless of the Court's choice, abandoning or limiting Vernonia would
strengthen the credibility of the decisions in Skinner, Von Raab, and Chandler. The
rationale of Skinner and Von Raab-publicsafety concerns balanced by a diminished
expectation of individual privacy-could be applied more consistently by the lower
courts if they were not required to rely on the Vernonia role model rationale. The
Chandler decision would make more sense because the Court, based on precedent,
effectively could reject the drug testing policy as symbolic and as an attempt to make
candidates into role models, without having to effectively distinguish Vernonia.
B. Add More Specific Requirements to the Special Needs Test or Replace it
Altogether
Commentators are correct when they complain about the arbitrary way in which
the special needs test is applied.249 Their misguided approval of the Chandler
decision may be viewed as a thinly veiled sigh of relief that the Court once again did
not uphold a Fourth Amendment search based on the results of a test that cannot be
applied consistently.

See Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1304 (1997) ("Candidates for public office
...
are subject to relentless scrutiny-by their peers, the public, and the press. Their day-today conduct attracts attention notably beyond the norm in ordinary work environments.").
246

247

Id.

See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) ("Therefore, in the specific
context of school discipline,we hold that a school board member is not immune from liability
for damages under § 1983 ... .") (emphasis added). The Court in Wood thus limited the
applicability of its § 1983 decision to schools. The Court could limit the Vernonia decision
in the same way by stating that the rationale relied on in that decision was intended to be used
only to analyze suspicionless drug testing policies promulgated in public school systems.
249 See Buffaloe, supra note 108; Brown, infra note 264.
241
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The Court seems to have acknowledged that the special needs balancing test
provides the proper framework for analysis of suspicionless drug testing policies."'0
The Court has relied on that balancing test in deciding each of the four cases in
which it has addressed random drug testing."' Nevertheless, the special needs
exception is rife with inconsistencies that negate almost entirely its effectiveness as
a tool ofjudicial analysis.
Authors Michael Vaughn and Rolando V. del Carmen identify at least five
problems with the special needs exception:..
(I) Because the special needs test has no clear standards, "danger
looms that the Court, serving an ideological agenda and using the
convenience of a balancing test, may effectively negate decades of Fourth
Amendment precedent and case law by carving out a few broad
exceptions that can be misinterpreted and misapplied by lower courts." '53
(2) "[T]he balancing test used by the Court in some cases is so broad
it can subordinate virtually any individual interest in favor of competing
governmental concerns. 254
(3) The special needs test originally was designed to apply only when
"no other reasonable alternative was available"; it has since been
expanded. 5
(4) "[T]he line between administrative and law enforcement searches
is in fact often blurred and difficult to distinguish. '256 As a result, it is
easier for the Court to rely on the special needs test than on the traditional
Fourth Amendment requirements of warrant and probable cause.
(5) A court that wants to maintain a "crime-control agenda" can rely
on the "end-justifies-the-means" rationale of the special needs test to
validate searches for the purposes of law enforcement, even though such
searches are improper under the strictures of the test. Such a result is
possible because the special needs test is so easy to manipulate.257
250

See Michael A. Mass, Public Sector Drug Testing: A BalancingApproach and the

Searchfor a New Equilibrium, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 231, 249 (1990).
In light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Skinner and Von Raab, as well as

the circuit court decisions extending their application, it seems clear that
suspicionless warrantless drug testing will be constitutionally evaluated using a
kind of ad hoc balancing approach. What is not yet clear is how this balance will
be struck.
Id.
251

See supra note 183.

252

See Michael S. Vaughn & Rolando V. del Carmen, "Special Needs" in Criminal

Justice: An Evolving Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant and Probable Cause
Requirements, 3 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 203, 220-23 (1993).
254

Id. at 220.
Id at 221.

255

Id. at 221-22.

256
257

Id. at 222.
Id at 222-23.
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It may not be possible to eliminate all of the problems with the special needs
exception to the Fourth Amendment. One cannot fault the Court for wanting to
' particularly because of the rampant drug
consider "compelling state interests,"258
problems that continue to plague this nation.59 A socio-political agenda cannot
supplant the constitutional mandates of the Fourth Amendment, yet the special needs
test, at times, seems designed to serve just that purpose. A decision by the Court to
change the requirements of the special needs test, or to simply refuse to apply it, may
help to establish some consistency in future suspicionless drug testing cases.
CONCLUSION

The Chandlerdecision is not indicative of a new trend by the Court to strike
down suspicionless drug testing policies. It is, rather, an illustration of how difficult
it is to render consistent decisions when relying on the special needs exception to the
26 ° Vernonia,2 61 Von Raab262 and Skinne 263 all cannot
Fourth Amendment. Chandler,
exist concurrently as coherent examples of Supreme Court suspicionless drug testing
doctrine; the inconsistencies are simply too great. Chandlermay require a different
result than its predecessors, but the Court must find a way to distinguish the
Chandler rationale, particularly with respect to the Vernonia and Von Raab
decisions.
Regardless of whether commentators approve or disapprove of the Chandler
2 65
The problem lies in the
decision,2 64 the underlying problem is not Chandler.

258
259
260

See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
See supra note 6.
117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).

263

515 U.S. 646 (1995).
489 U.S. 656 (1989).
489 U.S. 602 (1989).

264

See, e.g., Nathan A. Brown, Recent Developments: Reining in the National Drug

261
262

Testing Epidemic, Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997), 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
253 (1998) (supporting the Chandlerdecision, but suggesting that the Court should overrule
Von Raab to make sense of the Court's suspicionless drug testing doctrine); Buffaloe, supra
note 108, at 564 n.al (applauding the Court's efforts to draw a bright line for constitutionally
permissible drug testing, but criticizing its methodology). But cf David G. Savage, Speaking
of Drugs and Deadbeats: Court Says No Testing of Candidates,No Child Support Class

Action Against States, 83 A.B.A. J. 46, 47 (1997) ("[The Chandlerdecision] appears to
doom proposals to test large groups of white-collar government workers."); Justin Scott,
Casenote, 49 MERCER L. REv. 1131, 1139 (1998) ("Perhaps the holding in Chandlerwill
doom future deployments of the government's 'Draconian weapon-the compulsory
collection and chemical testing of ... blood and urine' on large groups of white-collar
employees in an attempt to revitalize this nation's war on drugs." (footnote omitted)).
265 See Brown, supra note 264, at 254 ("Chandler exposes Von Raab as anomalous and
inconsistent with previous suspicionless search cases to which Chandleradheres."); Buffaloe,
supra note 108, at 564 n.al ("This casual reliance on the standard of general reasonableness
reaffirms the fear expressed throughout this Note that a balancing test isreplacing the warrant
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Court's analysis of suspicionless drug testing cases. Although scholars, and certainly
the Court itself, may disagree about what should be altered or disregarded, 66 the
solution to the Chandler inconsistencies depends upon the Court's ability to
restructure the special needs balancing test and reconcile its own suspicionless drug
testing precedent.
Ross H PARR

and probable cause requirements as the touchstone of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.").
Cf Dery, supra note 17, at 103 ("The Chandler Court decided that Georgia's mandate to
drug test candidates for state office went too far. Yet, trapped in a doctrine of its own making
[the special needs test], the Court could not rationally distinguish state politicians from
railroad employees, Customs Service agents, or schoolchildren.").
266 See sources cited supra notes 264-65.

